The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1This book is a beautiful classic. James is unafraid to tackle the perplexing questions about consciousness. He is also unencumbered by simplistic theoretical assumptions or restrictive definitions of science, but he holds to a high standard of clarity and steers for the truth.
This book is a brilliant catalogue of the phenomena that must be explained by the various brain and psychological sciences. While the behaviorist movement that came after James led to important advances in scientific method, in terms of objectively establishing empirical results, it also led to a massive denial of mental phenomena that cannot at present be explained purely in mechanical or behaviorial terms. Because subsequent generations have denied the phenomena, or written them off as "illusions" or "folk psychology," as is still common today, this book is a precious trove of unbiased insights about the mind.
I would thus agree with the other reviewers that this is a great book. However, while they seem to claim James for functionalism, (which is I think the dominant framework for understanding mind in contemporary cognitive science--holding that implementing certain functions such as self-representation and planning, are what makes a system conscious, no matter what it's made out of) I suggest that much of James' critique of what he calls the "mind-stuff theory" and the "associationists" is equally devastating to what is now called functionalism. For example, people still talk about patterns of brain actvity as if they had objective, ontological reality. But we can completely describe the brain at the level of molecules without reference to patterns, so the pattern is not an intrinsic, necessary way of interpreting the activity of the physical brain system. Similarly, having the idea of A and the idea of B does not imply having the idea of A+B. James makes this basic point in multiple ways in his book. It seems more or less equivalent to the point articulated in recent times by John Searle, that "any physical process you might find is computational only relative to some interpretation," ie some observer (in "The Mystery of Consciousness" p.16). When expressed in Searle's modern language, it is more clear why the distinction between real objective properties of a system and its extrinsic observer-dependent properties, is a big problem for contemporary functionalism.
In any case, I highly recommend this book to any serious student of psychology. It's not for boneing up for psych exams or grant proposals, but for patiently ruminating on and savoring. --Reviewer: Michael Wiest (Durham, NC United States)
